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C.P. Stacey and the Use of Oral
Testimony in the Dieppe Narratives
Tavis Harris

O

peration Jubilee, the raid on the
port of Dieppe, proved one of
the most disastrous episodes for the
Canadian Army during the Second
World War. On 19 August 1942, a
force of approximately 5,000 men
from the 2nd Canadian Division
under the command of Major-General
John Hamilton Roberts attempted to
seize the German-occupied port to
destroy military infrastructure and
acquire intelligence by capturing
prisoners and documents. 1 Of the
4,658 who embarked on the operation,
only 2,210 returned to England. The
Canadians suffered 3,367 casualties
including 1,946 prisoners of war.2
The task of documenting this
disaster fell to Major Charles Perry
Stacey, the historical officer at
Canadian Military Headquarters.
Stacey’s job was to compile
information for official histories
to be written at the war’s end. He
undertook the task by drafting a
series of “narratives,” detailed,
heavily referenced factual accounts
based on the fullest information he
could gather.3 In the case of Dieppe,
Stacey, and historical officers under
his command who arrived in 1942,
produced no fewer than 15 narratives
by the end of the European war,
each incorporating new bodies of
information that came to hand. These
narratives are of particular interest
because they represent Stacey’s
first attempt to capture information

Abstract: As the official historian for
the Canadian Army in the Second World
War, C.P. Stacey understood both the
benefits and limitations of oral history.
This is especially evident within his
work on the Dieppe narratives which
shaped a portion of the Canadian
Army’s Official History. Dieppe was
Stacey’s first foray into report writing
and though his use of oral testimony
related to circumstances rather than
a methodological preference and he
remained aware of its limitations, he
nevertheless employed it throughout the
narratives. It is clear that oral testimony
was central to the narratives and
provided otherwise irretrievable pieces
of information. This study examines
the narratives in conjunction with
Stacey’s war diaries, memoirs, and other
secondary sources to determine the
extent to which oral testimony was used
in addition to how and when it was used,
especially in the case of sensitive issues
involving Dieppe’s contentious legacy.

on a major battle, one that was
immediately controversial, and,
because of the scope of the disaster
and losses, whose documentary
record was incomplete. For this latter
reason, Stacey for the first time relied
on oral accounts, which were central
to the development of the Dieppe
narratives. This was Stacey’s first
experience in creating and using oral
history materials. By using records of
interviews from Stacey’s war diary
and the Dieppe narratives, this paper
traces the role of oral testimony in
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Stacey’s account of tank operations,
one of the key aspects of the operation
for which there was little or no
written evidence because of heavy
casualties.4
C.P. Stacey is best remembered as
the official historian for the Canadian
army during the Second World
War, but he was not appointed to
this position until the autumn of
1945. 5 At the time of the Dieppe
raid, Stacey’s chief task as head of
the historical section at Canadian
Military Headquarters (CMHQ)
was to “prepare material for the
official historian…and further
document the war effort by collecting
historical evidence ‘not otherwise
available.’” 6 In 1940, then MajorGeneral H.D.G. Crerar, chief of the
general staff in Ottawa, arranged
Stacey’s appointment as the overseas
historical officer to supervise the
collection process and avoid the
“disaster” of the Great War official
history program.7 Many officers at
CMHQ in London initially distrusted
Stacey. They refused to believe that
the authorities in Ottawa would
send an officer solely to conduct
historical work, and considered
him a “spy for National Defence
headquarters.”8 Colonel G.R. Turner,
general staff officer, 1st Canadian
Infantry Division, considered
sharing operational information in
the planning stages a “dangerous
practice,” and worried that “this
67
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Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Perry Stacey, photographed here in London during the
war, was the head of the historical section at Canadian Military Headquarters. In that
capacity he was responsible for drafting a series of narratives on the Dieppe Raid.

pesky chronicler would ‘practically
be at the Commander’s elbow.’” 9
However, Stacey quickly developed
a positive working relationship with
General Andrew McNaughton,
commander of the Canadian Army
overseas from 1939 to 1943, and
General Crerar, who came overseas
in December 1941, and in early 1944
succeeded McNaughton in command
of the Canadian Army. McNaughton,
like Crerar whom he had mentored
since they first served together during
the First World War, had a scholarly
turn of mind and understood the
nature and role of official history.
This positive relationship with the
68
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senior commanders allowed Stacey
considerable access to classified
files and to key individuals in the
British as well as the Canadian
forces, and to such senior civilians
as Vincent Massey, the Canadian
High Commissioner in London, and
his staff. 10 General McNaughton
“took Stacey into his confidence”
discussing high-level policy with
the historian, and allowing access
to his personal files under condition
that Stacey exercise discretion with
the information. This relationship
proved greatly beneficial, as Stacey
was able to “invoke” the general’s
name to gain access to necessary

records or interviewing “recalcitrant
individuals.”11
At the time of his appointment,
Stacey was a relatively young
academic; he had completed his
doctorate at Princeton in 1933.
Although much of his work,
including his dissertation, dealt
with the nineteenth century, he had
always been interested in current
military subjects and his book The
Military Problems of Canada, written
in 1938-40 on current issues in
defence policy, brought him to
Crerar’s attention, then commandant
at the Royal Military College. 12
From the time Stacey arrived in
England in December 1940 until
late 1942, he had few resources at
his command and conducted much
of the work himself. In addition to
developing the narratives, Stacey had
to personally ensure that the army
created and preserved the records
he, and the yet unnamed official
historian, required. He visited units
stationed across England, constantly
reminding officers of the need to write
comprehensive unit war diaries, and
to retain orders, communications
logs, conference notes and other
material that explained the unit’s
development and activities.13 Stacey
received no directives from senior
officers concerning what materials
he should assemble and how he
should do it. The use of oral accounts
in the case of the Dieppe narratives
was a pragmatic response to a
difficult situation. These narratives
represented a steep learning curve
that he later described as “the
heaviest job of historical research that
fell to me during the war. [P]utting
together documented narratives of
[the Dieppe operation] took up all the
time I could spare for the better part
of two years.”14
At the time of the raid, Stacey
was on privilege leave in Edinburgh
and only learned of the attack as it
occurred. He remarked in his diary
that he had “chosen a bad time to
go on leave” and contacted CMHQ
2
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Regiment, returned to England in
the immediate aftermath of the raid.
Stacey noted in his war diary that
“the tank story…[was] difficult to
reconstruct.”19 Stacey spent months
of painstaking work piecing together
the events. There were a few written
reports by returning non-armour
officers from other units who had
witnessed the activities of the Calgary
tanks, and these he fleshed out
by interviewing personnel of the
Calgary Regiment who managed to
escape from France, or who were later
repatriated from German captivity on
medical grounds.
Stacey’s memoirs and personal
files provide ample evidence
regarding his view of oral history.
Though his opinion is often negative,
he does concede that such evidence is
valuable and often necessary in cases
where there is a lack of other sources.
Stacey’s attitudes reflect a “middle

ground” compared to his American
and British counterparts. While the
Americans were “pioneers” in oral
history, conducting experiments to
determine when a soldier’s memory
became corrupted, the British
disdained oral testimony, focusing
entirely on written records.20 Stacey’s
chief concern with oral accounts was
the amount of time between incident
and interview. Though he did not
necessarily agree with an American
conclusion that the maximum period
was six days, he did concede that the
validity of an account “is directly
related to the length of time that
elapsed between the event and the
moment when the account was
written or the interview took place.”
Stacey had “no hesitation in saying
that one scrap of paper written on
the evening of the battle is worth
reams of reminiscence written down
or spoken into tape recorders after

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2012

to determine if he was required
back in London.15 Though CMHQ
saw little reason for his return,
Stacey came back on 21 August to
“start work on what was clearly
going to be a big job.” 16 Having
been entirely left “out of the loop,”
Stacey had to be resourceful and
determined in acquiring information.
Stacey discussed arrangements
with Brigadier Churchill Mann,
brigadier general staff, 1st Division
Headquarters, to interview survivors,
which Mann granted on 24 August
1 9 4 2 . 17 C a n a d i a n a n d B r i t i s h
authorities subjected Stacey to intense
pressure over the issue of assigning
responsibility in creating the initial
drafts of the Dieppe narratives.18
Stacey faced a daunting task
creating narratives due to incomplete
evidence. For example, only one
member of the armoured unit landed
at Dieppe, the 14th Calgary Tank
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contained timed entries concerning
information received and sent out.
Since officers did not create the log for
historical purposes, it was impersonal
and contemporary. Availability of
the logbook allowed a historian to
reconstruct a unit’s part in a battle
with confidence – and the absence
of such a log left the researcher
“hamstrung.”26
Stacey did not leave notes
detailing his interview process, but
combining statements from his war
diary with his memoirs provides
some insight. In his memoirs, Stacey
stated that in preparing, one should
begin by “reading the written
evidence before the interview. In
that way [the historian] will not
only be able to assess the value
of what he is being told, but he
will be equipped to prompt the
person he is interviewing.”27 After
this preparation, Stacey conducted
several interviews with a subject, then
draft a comprehensive memorandum
that aimed at capturing the subject’s
complete testimony. Stacey asked
the subject to review the memo
and make any necessary changes
before signing the document to
attest to its veracity. In his war diary,
Stacey recorded his impression of
the testimony individuals provided
during interviews. An example is his
reflections on Captain G.A. Browne
of the Royal Canadian Artillery
and Lieutenant A.A. Masson of the
Fusiliers Mont-Royal, who escaped
from German captivity and returned
to England 27 January 1943. Stacey
took the two officers to lunch and
set up interviews that took place
three days later.28 Stacey noted that
while Lieutenant Masson was “not
a very satisfactory witness” having
a “tendency to change his evidence
when ‘cross-examined,’” Captain
Browne was “a first-rate witness,
whose written report is a remarkable
piece of observation.” Of Browne,
Stacey remarked, “this officer should
go far.”29

Stacey began his work on the
Dieppe raid by interviewing survivors
almost immediately after his return
from Scotland, suggesting he fully
realized the importance of oral
testimonies.30 Shortly after the raid,
Stacey visited Captains Cameron and
Alexander of the 14th Army Tank
Regiment (The Calgary Regiment)
to underscore the importance of
the unit’s war diary given the
absence of returning personnel. 31
Nevertheless, when on 31 May
1943, Stacey reviewed 2nd Division
documents slated for destruction
he discovered an operational order
not included in the tank regiment’s
war diary. There were no known
copies of the order before Stacey’s
discovery, despite its importance
as the only written operational
order for any participating unit. 32
The war diary did include several
key pieces of evidence, notably
about the difficulties the stony beach
created for the tracked vehicles.
The tank commanded by Captain
A.G. Stanton, adjutant of the 14th
Army Tank Regiment immediately
bogged down in the loose shale,
preventing other armoured units
from exiting the landing craft. The
war diary provided some detail on
the unit’s combat experience during
the raid, leading Stacey to conclude,
“all tanks which got ashore fought
very hard until either out of action
or out of ammunition.”33 The total
approximate losses for the regiment
were 17 officers and 153 other ranks
along with 28 tanks and 7 scout cars.34
There was, however, a paucity of
detail in the diary because “only two
members of the total tank crews on
shore managed to get away and the
remainder were either killed or taken
prisoner.”35
The early Dieppe narratives
contain very little information about
tank operations. CMHQ report no.83
written in September 1942 indicated
that “The first wave of tanks came
under heavy fire as soon as they
came out of the landing craft, and

Canadian Forces photo

months or years have passed. The
best historical evidence is evidence
recorded at the time [emphasis in
original].”21
Gaps in evidence often
necessitated interviews long
after the event occurred. Though
Stacey conducted such interviews,
he cautioned that they should be
done only “when the contemporary
evidence fails you” and they are
carefully checked against available
written records. 22 His greatest
concern in this regard was the
“unintentional liar.” Though Stacey
seldom encountered a deliberate liar,
many of those he came across had
undergone traumatic experiences.
Prisoners of war who had spent
“years behind the barbed wire,
brooding about the experiences,
convincing themselves that things
had happened which in fact never
took place, and perhaps cherishing
grudges against people whom they
considered responsible for their
plight.” Others were officers who “felt
they had been hard done by, and…
built up myths in their own minds
about those whom they considered
the authors of their misfortunes.”
Some individuals experienced
a “sea-change” in memory over
time, becoming “dedicated to their
misconceptions, and refused to be
convinced by contrary evidence,
however overwhelming.”23 Stacey
freely offered similar advice, notably
to an historian who asked for guidance
on a book concerning “the human
side of the war in Northwest Europe”
that included 460 interviews with
veterans from across the country.24
“All my experience as a historian,”
Stacey responded, “indicates that
interviews based on the memories
of individuals are very much less
reliable than the contemporary
documents. And when the memories
are forty years old they are often very
misleading.”25
In his opinion, operations logs
were “superior to all others as a
source of information.” The log
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while some immediately got on to
the boulevard in front of the town
and penetrated further, others did not
get off the beach.”36 Casualties among
engineering personnel assigned to
breach a sea wall with explosives or
timber ramps prevented many tanks
from leaving the beach. 37 Despite
the fact that a number of the tanks
were immobilized by damage, they
“continued to fight [sic] their guns
with the greatest courage, engaging
the batteries which were firing on
the landing craft.”38 At 1100 hours
an order was given to abandon the
tanks in order to re-embark surviving
personnel.
The importance of interviews
in shaping the Dieppe narratives
is evident in CMHQ report no.89
written in December 1942. Interviews
with individuals who escaped were
a “valuable supplement” to written
evidence provided by returnees
and unit war diaries. These oral
accounts provided information of the
operation “not available otherwise.”39
Unfortunately, the escapees included

no armoured personnel, but some
additional details emerged from
the evidence of soldiers from other
branches. Several factors hindered
Stacey’s attempt to reconstruct
the activities of the Calgary tanks.
Besides the lack of returning
personnel to interview, those who
managed to escape and return to
England had little contact with tank
survivors while in captivity.40 Much
of the evidence concerning tank
operations centered on instances in
which infantrymen and engineers
encountered tanks during the raid,
and provided only momentary
glimpses. Sergeant G.A. Dickson
of the Royal Canadian Engineers
testified that at least five tanks had
reached the esplanade (sea-wall), and
that at least three tanks managed to
reach the town, last seen moving west
on la Rue de la Barre.41
Private J. Maier of the Essex
Scottish stated that all three tanks on
Landing Craft Tank 4 had managed
to land, and that one tank (Burns) had
its track broken by enemy fire after

crossing through one wire barrier,
to open a path for the infantry. 42
Maier also stated that four tanks were
“patrolling” on the road immediately
above the sea-wall and firing on
enemy positions but were unable
to provide cover fire for an infantry
advance. Despite broken tracks
and shell hits, the tanks kept up
continuous fire, with some still in
action at the time of evacuation.43
A medical repatriation of
prisoners from Dieppe in late October
1943 provided Stacey with a further
opportunity to fill gaps in his account.
He particularly hoped that Major
C.E. Page, the most senior officer of
the Calgary Regiment to get ashore,
and Corporal T.L. Carnie of the
Calgary Regiment could “add to our
knowledge of the action of tanks.”44
On 29 October 1943, Stacey arrived
at Taplow hospital in Maidenhead to
interview Major Page and Corporal
Carnie. Carnie was wounded in the
eye by shrapnel shortly after landing
and was unable to provide any details
on the operation.45 Stacey’s discussion

Stacey had trouble trying to accurately tell the story of the Calgary Tanks in
his early narratives of the raid as most those who landed became casualties
and so few men from the regiment returned to England.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015

71

5

Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 9

Canadian Forces photo PMR 86-292

Canadian Forces photo PMR 86-264

Page.49 He then began to consider the
many changes to the narratives this
new information made necessary.50
In November 1943, Major Page
visited Stacey in his office at CMHQ
to certify the accuracy of the draft
memorandum. This meeting became
a follow-up interview, as Page
provided the names of 13 tanks he
was certain had breached the sea
wall along with two “probables.”51
There is no indication of any
subsequent interviews with Major
Page suggesting certification of the
final copy of the memorandum at this
meeting. In the days following this
interview, Stacey began a thorough
review of the Dieppe narratives. On
10 November, he began to edit the
second section of the record “in the
light of new evidence.”52 Later in the
month, Stacey drafted CMHQ report
107 summarizing the interviews he
conducted over the previous month.
This report addressed a key issue
– namely, the number of tanks that
managed to reach the esplanade. The
description in this report provided a
great amount of detail in contrast to
earlier accounts:
Although Major Page confirms that
some tanks were certainly knocked
out on the central part of the beach,
where the esplanade was high, while
moving laterally and searching for
a way to cross the wall, he is quite

These two photos show Churchill tanks abandoned at Dieppe. In late 1943 men from
the Calgary Tanks were repatriated to England as a result of their wounds and were
able to provide Stacey with a more complete picture of tanks’ employment at Dieppe.

certain that 12 to 15 tanks crossed
the wall in the end sectors where it
was low. The majority of these tanks
had returned to the beach by about

with Major Page proved much more
helpful in reconstructing the activities
of the Calgary tanks. Page’s detailed
testimony “considerably alter[ed]
the picture” of tank operations. 46
Page indicated that he knew of no
tanks having penetrated into Dieppe
proper, though approximately 15
tanks had crossed the sea-wall with
a majority later returning to the
beach. Eighteen tanks had their
tracks broken by shellfire with an
additional four tanks immobilized by
72
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the chert beach.47 Heavy German fire
was unable to effectively penetrate
the Calgary tanks, and the unit did
not incur casualties from anti-tank
shells. As the result of its reliability,
all the men in Page’s unit were
“absolutely sold on” the Churchill
tank. Page was also certain that the
raid had caused “numerous” German
casualties (though no precise number
was mentioned).48 The following day
Stacey returned to CMHQ and drafted
a memorandum of his interview with

0900 hrs. The reason for this return
was the fact that the tanks could get
some cover there from the guns sited
in the East Cliff, while moreover
they “could get better shooting from
there.” This accounts for the large
concentration of tanks on the beach
north-east corner of the Casino,
an area which seemed especially
favourable.53

This new oral evidence also
demanded Stacey re-examine early
6
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copies of reports 108 and 109. 54
Though earlier drafts were not
included in Stacey’s personal papers,
the end result discussed earlier
suggests the important role oral
testimony played in shaping the
Dieppe narratives.
In May 1944, one month before
the Overlord invasion, Canadian
military intelligence sent a number
of translated German documents
concerning the Dieppe raid to Stacey
at CMHQ. 55 There was no clear
indication as to how the documents
fell into allied hands. Stacey thought
it probable that “they were captured
by allied troops in North Africa or
Italy.”56 The documents addressed
issues concerning pre-operation
security and the element of surprise,
the composition of the German
defenders and German casualties.
There was a concern that the invasion
force’s unexpected contact with a
German convoy had alerted shore
forces of the allied presence. The
German combat report stated, “the
entire coast defence system was
alerted,” though Stacey suggested
this passage was inserted in an
effort to “gloss over the fact that
this alert was not wholly general,
if this was in fact the case.”57 The
report also detailed the number of
German casualties. Earlier narratives
had simply stated that the Germans
had suffered “many” casualties
without providing a precise number.
Unfortunately for Stacey, the report
contained several differing totals. A
combat report submitted by the 302nd
Infantry Division (which presumably
contained all totals from the
operation) cited 67 killed (all ranks),
10 missing, and 167 wounded.58 This
differed greatly with the 440 total
casualties cited in an Organization
Todt report and significantly differed
from the German High Command’s
claims of 591 casualties.59
These discrepancies led Stacey
to ponder why German authorities
would falsify the figures. Though it
was “surprising” Stacey suggested
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
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AHQ Report no.36 (31 March 1950)

“The development of the German defences in the Dieppe sector
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actually smaller than were heretofore
have been prepared to concede.”62
A report from the Commander in
Chief West cited the total losses
as 591 men – identical to a High
Command official communiqué that
“forced … the conclusion that the C.
in C. West was more concerned with
maintaining uniformity with the
story already published than with
producing a completely accurate
statement.” 63 Given discrepancies
and shortcomings in written reports,
oral testimony played an important
role in Stacey’s reconstruction.
These German reports also
corroborated the testimony of Major
Page on key points – the number
of tanks crossing the sea wall and
the durability of the Churchill tank.
German sources estimated the number
of tanks that reached the Esplanade
as sixteen in total, a number similar
to Page’s claim. German fire was
also generally unable to pierce the
Churchill’s armour. Though two 37

mm shell holes had been found in
the tanks left on the beach after the
raid, German reports concluded that
both greater numbers and heavier
calibre anti-tank weapons would
be required to effectively penetrate
enemy armour. This supports Page’s
statements asserting the Churchill
tank’s satisfactory performance.64
On 1 September 1944, the
reconnaissance regiment of the
2nd Canadian Infantry Division
occupied the town of Dieppe as
part of operation Fusilade. The
plan had originally called for heavy
bomber strikes and significant naval
bombardment.65 Such preparations
proved unnecessary as the Germans
“chose to abandon Dieppe without
a fight.” 66 The first tasks for the
Canadians was to rest and conduct
a remembrance ceremony at the
graveyard containing casualties from
the August 1942 attack followed by a
ceremonial march through the town
by the original participating units.

Canadian Forces photo PMR 86-286

that “it might be dangerous…if only
from the point of view of morale,
to have it known in the Army that
the figures of loesses [sic] given to
the public were notably different
from the truth.” He thought it
conceivable “that figures of losses
circulated in a document like the
Combat Report now under review
might be altered before circulation.”
This was especially the case given
“the impression left with Canadian
prisoners after the operation is that
the Germans in fact has [sic] suffered
greatly.”60 Statistical divergences in
the captured German files frustrated
Stacey who thought it possible that
“we shall never receive a completely
reliable account of the German losses
at DIEPPE.”61 Post war analysis of
German war diaries suggested that
the figures had not been misstated
in the earlier intelligence intercepts
leading Stacey to conclude that
“German casualties, at least so far as
ground troops are concerned, were

An abandoned Churchil is examined by a German soldier after the raid.
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Second Canadian Infantry Division makes a triumphant return to Dieppe, 3 September 1944.

Stacey was present [on an historical
liaison trip to the army in the field?]
described the affair as “moving.”67
This occupation was not simply for
sentimental reasons as it provided
an opportunity for the Canadians to
examine Dieppe’s defences, which
the Germans had significantly
expanded since 1942. It was possible
to determine the degree of growth by
comparing recent aerial photos to an
earlier defence overprint.68
Postwar repatriations provided
Stacey with valuable sources. Several
former prisoners provided testimony
affording “interesting additions
to our knowledge of the Dieppe
operation” but Stacey cautioned
the official historian against “taking
(these accounts) in all respects
precisely at their face value” as
officers who had been prisoners of
war “were not in possession of the
full facts concerning the results of the
operation (Dieppe).”69 Interestingly
Stacey related a comment by a
Lieutenant Lee to the effect that
“every P.W is always extremely

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015

bitter.” The general perception of
those in prisoner camps was “liable
to be coloured by circumstances.”70
The war’s conclusion did not end
the work on the Dieppe narratives.
Controversies developing in the postwar period would greatly influence
the perception of the Calgary tanks
operational performance. LieutenantColonel Robert Ridley Labatt, former
prisoner of war and commander of
the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
during the Dieppe raid visited Ottawa
after the conclusion of hostilities to
provide his personal commentary
on the Dieppe narratives.71 Labatt
asserted that only three tanks had
reached the esplanade at any time
during the operation.72 With such
a divergence in testimony, Stacey’s
wrote to other recently repatriated
officers of the Calgary Regiment
who had served at Dieppe for further
information: Captain Edwin Bennett
and Lieutenant A.L. Breithaupt. He
used these officers’ written reports
acquired along with Major C.E.
Page’s oral account ascertaining the

actions of tanks at Dieppe. Stacey
noted that responses by both Captain
Bennett and Lieutenant Breithaupt
generally supported the earlier oral
testimony provided by Major Page.73
Breithaupt recalled, “13 or 15 tanks
had crossed the sea wall and reached
the Esplanade … Most of these tanks
with the exception of the few that
were knocked out on the Esplanade…
return[ed] to the beach on the order
of withdrawal.” 74 The written
statements of these two officers in
conjunction with Major Page’s oral
account “appear[ed] to establish
definitively the number of tanks
which crossed the wall.” Stacey’s
views concerning the “unintentional
liar” outlined in his memoirs likely
emerged as the result of incidents
such as this.
The result of this debate found its
way into CMHQ Report no.142 which
addressed several issues centering on
testimony of former prisoners of war.
The description of tank actions in the
report strongly reflected Major Page’s
testimony:
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initial landing of three L.C.T.s
[Landing Craft Tanks] approximately
on time (nine tanks), a dry landing,
moved up shingle but stopped by
anti-tank ditch. About this time one
troop from first flight was able to
reach promenade at extreme east and
near harbour jetty where they came
under heavy fire from cliffs. One
tank reached promenade on extreme
west end of promenade and came
under heavy fire. Town could not be
entered due to road blocks and these
tanks tried to neutralize observed
enemy positions from promenade.
They also tried road blocks on their
own without success. Consequently
tanks were confined to promenade
and beach. Approximately eighteen
tanks had racks knocked out by fire
but the interior of tanks were not
effected [sic] by fire. Subsequently
out of remainder of battalion, eleven
tanks reached shore making in all
twenty nine tanks. Many L.C.T.s
sunk. No tanks were evacuated.
Commanding Officer of Battalion
was killed. Intercommunication was
good throughout within [sic] tank
battalion but communication with
infantry useless.75

In addressing the issue of the
numbers and operational use of tanks
at Dieppe, oral history proved a key
source. In 1946, Stacey conducted
interviews with both Captain
Hughes-Hallett and Brigadier A.H.
Head for insights on planning. 76
Stacey conducted these interviews in
an effort to determine why planners
chose a frontal assault. A lack of
“strictly contemporary written
evidence” gave the interviews
increased importance.77
In the first volume of the official
histories, Stacey dedicated an entire
section to “The Fortunes of the
Tanks.” There were many reasons
the activities of the 14th Army Tank
Regiment’s performance at Dieppe
was important. It was the first unit
of the Canadian Armoured Corps
to see action, the first battle for the
76
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Churchill tank as well as the first
amphibious landing of tanks under
combat conditions. The interview
with Major Page played a prominent
role. Stacey used this information
in detailing the number of tanks in
operation and reconstructing their
activity once ashore. In all, 29 tanks
exited the landing crafts with 27
successfully landing.78 Once the tanks
had landed, they immediately faced
a sea-wall only surmountable at the
extreme ends which rose only two
feet above the beach. A track-laying
device created by a Major B. Sucharov
was to assist the tanks in crossing the
rocky beach facilitated this, but he
developed the chespaling track for
a beach with a different composition
to the chert rock at Dieppe.79 Plans
for the construction of timber ramps
allowing tanks to breach the wall in
the centre could not be built given
the heavy casualties sustained by
Canadian engineers resulting from
heavy German fire. Heavy concrete
roadblocks barred the streets leading
from the Promenade into the centre
of the town, effectively refusing
entry to the tanks. These obstacles
remained intact due to casualties,
lost equipment, and non-landed
demolition personnel.80
Major Page’s testimony provided
the basis for much of this section.
81
Though Page was certain that 13
had successfully crossed the wall
(along with two “probable”), his
testimony along with correspondence
with Lieutenant Bennett established
that 15 tanks had crossed the wall.82
Stacey dismissed claims by some
infantry commanders (LieutenantColonel Labatt for example) who
provided “much lower estimates
of the number that reached the
Promenade” by emphasizing that
“the evidence of the men who were
in the tanks was conclusive.”83 The
accounts provided by Page and
Bennett were supported by captured
German files from the 81st Corps held
that “‘probably 16’ tanks crossed the
Promenade.”84 Major Page’s evidence

also confirmed the “staunchness”
of the Churchill tank. The tank’s
armour “gave complete protection”
from the German’s 37 mm anti-tank
fire, suffering only 13 fatal casualties
during the operation.85 The lack of
returning personnel was explained
by the fact that the tanks “continued
firing, operating in effect as pillboxes,
and effectively supporting the
infantry” until long after evacuations
ceased. Infantrymen who witnessed
the actions of the tanks “speak in
the warmest terms of the manner in
which they fought.”86
The official histories also
reflect the difficulties Stacey had in
reconstructing the activities of the
Calgary tanks. “Information about
the tanks’ action was long very
meager, chiefly because only one man
(Trooper G. Volk) who had been in a
tank on shore returned to England.
Only when our first prisoners were
repatriated (on medical grounds)
in 1943 did the real facts begin to
emerge.”87 Many of these “real facts”
relied upon oral testimony.
The creation of the Dieppe
narratives and the role of the
Calgary tank regiment therein
represented several years of
methodical and painstaking research.
In reconstructing the activities of
tanks during Operation Jubilee,
Stacey employed a mixture of
oral testimony, allied planning
documents, war diaries, written
testimony, and captured German
files. The testimony of Major Page
proved important in establishing
key facts concerning the number of
tanks that managed to breach the
sea-wall that withstood contrary
claims with assistance of written
evidence supplied by other tank
officers who participated in the raid.
In his memoirs, Stacey advocated
a very cautious view regarding the
efficacy of oral testimony, believing
such sources were best used in cases
where no documentary sources
existed, and that there was an inverse
relationship between elapsed time
10
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and the accuracy of an interview. In
spite of these reservations, Stacey
made effective use of oral testimony
in examining the role of tanks in
creating the Dieppe narratives. The
lack of returning personnel from the
Calgary Tank Regiment left a gap in
documentary evidence elevating the
importance of oral testimony. Under
pressure and lacking resources and
directives, the young C.P. Stacey
sought to collect as much information
for the yet to be appointed official
historian to use in the future official
histories. To this end, Stacey created
a series of narratives in which the
oral testimony of individuals such as
Major Page played a vital role.
Stacey’s impact on the writing of
military history goes beyond his role
in shaping the Dieppe narratives into
the official histories as a whole though
much work remains to be done to
determine the extent of this influence.
After-action reporting and the
interviewing of returned personnel is
now common practice and historians
through the Directorate of History
and Heritage make extensive use
of war diaries and oral testimony
in crafting their narratives. Oral
history is increasingly playing an
important role in military history
as evidenced by the University of
Victoria’s ever-expanding catalogue
of interviews with veterans and
proves and invaluable source for
researchers. Though gaps remain
to be filled on this topic, Colonel
Charles Perry Stacey’s influence on
the writing of military history and
use of oral sources is evident.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

10.
11.
12.

Notes
This article originally appeared in Oral History
Forum d’histoire orale 31 (2011) and has been
reprinted with the kind permission of its
editors.
1.

C.P. Stacey, “Preliminary Report on
Operation ‘JUBILEE,’” Canadian Military
Headquarters (CMHQ) Report no.83,
Directorate of History and Heritage
(DHH), 19 September 1942, A-1.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015

13.
14.
15.
16
17.
18.

Note: Reports were often divided into
alphabetized sections. Capital letters
before numbers indicate the section and
page of the cited report.
C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian
Army in the Second World War. Vol.I: Six
Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain
and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer
and Controller of Stationary, 1955),
pp.387, 389.
These narratives took the form of
preliminary reports to the Canadian
Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in
London during the war and more
thorough reports to Army Headquarters
(AHQ) in the postwar era.
There are two versions of Stacey’s
war diary available at both Library
and Archives Canada [LAC] and the
University of Toronto Archives [UTA].
The former (in the following cited as
Stacey, War Diary, LAC) focuses more on
Stacey’s official duties while his personal
papers held in Toronto (in the following
cited as Stacey, War Diary, UTA) include
a more personal reflective view.
Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian
Historians and the Writing of the World
Wars (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2006), p.133.
Ibid., p.94.
Ibid. Colonel A Fortesque Duguid was
tasked with creating the official history
of the Canadian Expeditionary Force
(CEF) during the First World War, but
had only managed to produce a single
volume in 1938. Tim Cook notes that
despite Duguid’s inability to complete
the official histories, he was subject to
many pressures and successfully upheld
the CEF’s “memory and reputation.”
Ibid., p.95.
LAC, Record Group [RG] 24, vol.10752,
220 C.1009 (D35), Turner to McNaughton
[no date on letter], cited in Cook, Clio’s
Warriors, p.95.
Ibid.
Cook, Clio’s Warriors, p.95.
Paul Douglas Dickson, A Very Thoroughly
Canadian General: A Biography of General
H.D.G. Crerar (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2007), p.116. Stacey
had served as a militia subaltern in the
Canadian Corps of Signals and had
offered his services as such in summer
1940. General Crerar pushed for Stacey’s
appointment “in a capacity for which (he
was) so particularly suited.” C.P. Stacey,
A Date With History: Memoirs of a Canadian
Historian (Ottawa: Deneau, N.D, 1983),
p.63.
Cook, Clio’s Warriors, p.97.
Stacey, A Date With History, p.97.
Library and Archives Canada, RG 24,
vol.17508, C.P. Stacey War Diary, 19
August 1942.
Stacey, A Date With History, p.89.
Cook, Clio’s Warriors, p.99. See also Stacey,
War Diary, LAC, 24 August 1942.
Stacey initially shifted blame from
Canadian staff officers to Combined
Operations Headquarters (COHQ). After
“a significant amount of pressure,” he

19.

20.

21.
22.
23.

24.

25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

created a draft acceptable to Mountbatten
and the COHQ. Seeing an explanation
for the raid, the Canadian government
commissioned Stacey to create a “White
Paper” (which became CMHQ Report
no.83 – Report on Operation JUBILEE).
This was well-received in Canada, with
Minister of National Defence J.L. Ralston
reading the entire report into Hansard.
See Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized
Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989),
p.25; Stacey, A Date With History, p.92;
Cook, Clio’s Warriors, p.100.
Stacey, War Diary, LAC, 18 September
1942. The returned was a Trooper G. Volk
sent to Bramshott hospital as the result
of unspecified wounds. Unfortunately,
Stacey did not note the given name or
initials for either Captain Alexander or
Cameron.
Stacey, A Date With History, pp.229-230.
See also UTA, B90-0020 C.P. Stacey,
War Diary, Box 15, Notebook no.29, 11
December 1943–16 February 1944, 28
January 1944, p.64: “Called on Col. Lathan
to discuss various problems. Explained
our field system to him. He has little
faith in interviewing, however; like all
the British official historians, he founds
everything on the war diary.”
Stacey, A Date With History, p.230.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp.231-232. Bereton Greenhous
express a similar view of oral history to
Stacey’s in his work on the Dieppe raid
“Whenever practicable the words of
actual participants have been used…and
(since recollections often change over the
years in favour of more dramatic, amusing
or self-serving versions)…[the words] are
as contemporary, or near-contemporary
as research permits.” Bereton Greenhous,
Dieppe, Dieppe (Ottawa: Publishing,
Supply and Services Canada, 1992), p.11.
Personal letter from Jean E. Portugal
to C.P. Stacey 29 July 1987. UTA, C.P.
Stacey Personal Records B90-0020, Box
005. The book in question is likely We
Were There: A Record for Canada, 7 vols.
(Shelburne: Royal Canadian Military
Institute Heritage Society, 1998). This
is the only published work listed under
the name Jean E. Portugal, and the topic
matter is similar to that described in the
letter to Stacey. The length of the work
(seven volumes in total) would require a
lengthy research and writing process.
Personal letter from C.P. Stacey to Jean
E. Portugal, 1 July 1987 (content of letter
strongly suggests it was misdated) UTA,
C.P. Stacey Personal Records B90-0020,
Box 005.
Stacey, A Date With History, p.230.
Ibid.
Stacey, War Diary, (LAC), 27 January
1943.
Ibid., 30 January 1943.
Ibid., 24 August 1942. Stacey interviewed
a Sub-Lieutenant D.J. Lewis of the
RCNVR, who had been a member of a
commando party. In addition to writing
the narratives, Stacey was also charged

77

11

Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 9

31.

32.

33.
34.
35.

36.
37.

38.
39.

40.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

46.
47.

48.

with the task of compiling a list for
honours and awards. See Stacey, War
Diary, LAC, 25 August 1942.
Stacey, War Diary, LAC, 18 September
1942. Stacey notes that Captains Cameron
and Alexander were the “Adjutant and
Medical Officer respectively.” There is
no mention in the diary whether the two
officers had been a part of the Dieppe raid
or had remained in England to compile
the war diary.
Stacey, War Diary, LAC, 31 May 1943.
Stacey had written to 2nd Division
headquarters on 28 January 1943 seeking
any messages not included in the war
diary. Stacey managed to acquire
discretionary rights in regards to the
retention or destruction of documents
sent to the historical section. Stacey, War
Diary, LAC, 31 May 1943.
Stacey, War Diary, LAC, 31 May 1943.
Ibid.
Ibid. It is not clear who the second
individual was. Stacey’s typed war diary,
the Dieppe narratives and the later official
history cite Trooper Volk as the sole
returnee.
Stacey, “Preliminary Report on Operation
JUBILEE,” CMHQ Report no.83, DHH,
A-8-9.
Ibid., A-9. See also Hugh G. Henry, “The
Calgary Tanks at Dieppe,” Canadian
Military History 4, no.1 (Spring 1995),
pp.61-74, 67.
Ibid., p.A-9.
C.P. Stacey, “The Operation at DIEPPE, 19
Aug 42: Personal Stories of Participants,”
CMHQ Report no.89, 31 December 1942,
DHH, p.3.
C.P. Stacey, The Operation at DIEPPE,
19 Aug 42: Further Personal Stories of
Participants CMHQ Report no.90, 11
February 1943, DHH, p.A-3.
Ibid., p.F-4 .
Ibid., pp.D-1, D-3.
Ibid., D-4, D-5.
Stacey, War Diary, UTA, B 90-0020 Box. 16
Notebook no.28, 8 October – 10 December
1943, 23 October 1943, pp.21-22.
C.P. Stacey, “The Operation at DIEPPE,
19 Aug 42: ‘Further Personal Stories of
Participants’” CMHQ Report no.107, 29
November 1943; DHH, p.8. Note: Report
title same as Stacey’s CMHQ report
number 90.
Stacey, War Diary, (LAC), 29 October
1943.
Chert is a hard, sedimentary rock
composing the beaches at Dieppe. Tanks
would dig themselves into ruts created
by their tracks, which allowed stones
to enter between the drive sprocket and
track, breaking the pins that secured the
track links. See Henry, “Calgary Tanks at
Dieppe,” p.66.
Stacey, War Diary, UTA, B 90-0020 Box. 16
Notebook no.28, 8 October–10 December
1943.

78
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/9

49. Ibid., 30 October 1943, pp.31-33.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 6 November 1943, p.36. Page
stated that the following tanks crossed
the wall: Bob, Bellicose, Bert, Cougar,
Bill, Cat, Betty, Cheeta, Blondie, Caustic,
Brenda, Company and Bluebell. The two
“probables” were Beefy and Bloody.
Stacey, CMHQ Report no.107 , p.9.
52. Stacey, War Diary, UTA, B 90-0020 Box. 16
Notebook no.28, 8 October–10 December
1943.10 November 1943, p.51.
53. Stacey, CMHQ Report no.107, p.9.
54. Stacey, War Diary, LAC, 11-15 December
1943.
55. Ibid., 8 May 1944.
56. Stacey, “Operation ‘JUBILEE’: The Raid
on Dieppe, 19 August 42. Additional
Information from German Sources,”
CMHQ Report no.116; 10 May 1944,
DHH, p.2.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p.5.
59. Ibid., pp.6-7. Organization Todt was a
civil and military engineering group
named after its founder Fritz Todt.
The organization was responsible for
coordinating engineering projects
across the Reich and its conquered or
occupied territories. “Organization
Todt,” Yad Vashem, Shoah Research
Centre, <http://www1.yadvashem.org/
odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20
5807.pdf> (accessed 5 March 2008).
60. Stacey, “Operation ‘JUBILEE’: The Raid
on Dieppe, 19 August 42. Additional
Information from German Sources,” CMHQ
Report no.116. 10 May 1944 DHH, p.6.
61. Ibid.
62. C.P. Stacey , “Update” Army Headquarters
Report [AHQ] no.10, n.d., DHH, p.43.
63. Ibid., pp.43-44.
64. Stacey, CMHQ Report no.116, p.9.
65. C.P. Stacey, “The OPERATION at
DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42: Some New
Information,” CMHQ Report no.128,
20 November 1944, DHH, pp.8-9. The
naval squadron tasked consisted of two
battleships, two monitors (shallow draft
shore bombardment ships), four cruisers,
and eight landing craft gunboats. If the
original raid had received similar naval
support (and aerial bombardment), the
event may not have been such a debacle.
66. Ibid., p.9.
67. Ibid., p.10.
68. Ibid., p.12. A defence overprint is a type
of topographic map.
69. C.P. Stacey, “OPERATION ‘JUBILEE’:
The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Further
New Information,” CMHQ Report
no.142, 19 August 1942, DHH, p.2.
70. Ibid.
71. C.P. Stacey, “OPERATION ‘JUBILEE’:
The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II:
The Execution of the Operation. Section 2:
The Attack on the Main Beaches.” CMHQ
Report no.108. 26 November 1949, DHH,

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.

79.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

p.2. Lieutenant-Colonel Labatt had been
captured “after some time in the water”
while awaiting evacuation on the Royal
Navy Gunboat Locust. See C.P. Stacey,
“Article Dealing with the OPERATION at
Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. CMHQ Report no.98
15 July 1943, p.A-20.
Stacey, CMHQ Report no.108, pp.2-3.
Ibid., p.3.
Ibid.
Stacey, CMHQ Report no.142, p.10.
Brigadier A.H. Head was the military
advisor at Combined Operations at the
time of the Dieppe Raid.
C.P. Stacey “Operation ‘JUBILEE’: The
Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. New Light
on Early Planning,” CMHQ Report
no.153, 22 March 1946; C.P. Stacey
Papers, UTA, B91-0013 Box 007,File 2.
See also C.P. Stacey, CMHQ Report
no.159, “OPERATION ‘JUBILEE’: The
Raid on Dieppe 19 Aug 42. Additional
Information on Planning,” UTA, B910013, Box 001.
Stacey, Official History of the Canadian
Army in the Second World War, p.379. Two
of the tanks had “drowned” upon exiting
the LCT.
Henry, “Calgary Tanks at Dieppe,” p.68.
“Chespaling” was a long roll of wooden
track mounted at the front of the tank,
which would unfurl to provide a firm
path for the tanks and other vehicles to
traverse. The track laying mechanism
on several tanks was damaged during
transport to Dieppe and removed by
engineers in the landing crafts.
Stacey, Official History of the Canadian
Army in the Second World War, p.380.
Ibid., p.379.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.380.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Tavis Harris completed a BA and MA
in history at the University of Waterloo
before commencing his PhD under
Dr Roger Sarty at Wilfrid Laurier
University. His thesis addresses Canada’s
participation in the interwar naval
disarmament process and the impact
these conferences had on autonomy and
security planning. He has published
work on Canada and the Geneva Protocol
along with Stacey’s development of the
Dieppe Narratives. Besides his academic
pursuits, he serves as an officer in the
Royal Canadian Navy, a director of the
Hamilton Naval Historical Association
and is an avid powerlifter.

12

